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Abstract
Speciesism is the wrong of not acknowledging the moral qualities that
non-human animals possess that are similar or equivalent or even
superior to the moral qualities that human beings possess. However,
since it is manifestly clear that no one thinks that apes are in any way
obligated to human beings, it clearly cannot be a form of speciesism
to be mindful of the differences on the basis of which that is so. In
opposition to the advocates of the Great Ape Project, my aim in this
essay is to establish the quite minimal claim that apes should not
have the same moral status as human beings because human beings
have a far greater capacity for moral responsibility than do apes. The
claim that I wish to establish is quite compatible with the claim that
apes should be treated in a much more morally wholesome manner.

Introduction
In George Orwell’s classic novel Animal Farm, we find the
following riveting statement: “All animals are equal but some are
more equal than others”. It will be recalled that after a most valiant
attempt to install complete equality among the pigs on the farm, it
turned out that a hierarchy manifested itself among them after all.
The point of the story, of course, is that human beings will invariably
make distinctions between themselves, even if those distinctions have
no basis in hard cold facts. Some maintain that a like claim holds for
the moral differences that human beings draw between themselves
and all other non-human animals, especially apes. More precisely,
they hold that there is no substantive moral difference between the
ape and human beings. The numerous individuals who advanced this
claim include Jane Goodall, Francine Patterson & Wendy Gordon,
and Peter Singer. In general, this is the core idea of the Great Ape
Project and the articles presented in the collection of essays by Paola
Cavalieri and Peter Singer entitled The Great Ape Project: Equality
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Beyond Humanity.1 And it should no doubt be noted that in 2008
Spain passed legislation according apes the right to life and freedom.
I shall return to this point momentarily.
Just what all the supporters of the Great Ape Project mean is
perhaps open to debate. However, in their essay “The Case for the
Personhood of Gorillas,” France Patterson and Wendy Gordon
explicitly argue that there is no moral difference between human
beings and gorillas or apes. And in their essay “Chimpanzee’s Use of
Language,” Fouts and Fouts insist that there is no substantive
difference between the use of language by chimpanzees and the use of
language by humans. Indeed, Fouts and Fouts conclude their essay
by claiming that chimpanzees are in effect none other than the
siblings of human beings. While different authors make different
claims, the overall spirit of the essays is that it is rather arbitrary and
indefensible to claim that there is any substantive difference between
apes and human beings. Such is the general direction of the essays in
the volume.
In this essay, I shall that for all the extraordinary parallels that
exist between apes and human beings, there is one significant moral
respect in which apes and human beings are not moral equal; and
that is with respect to moral responsibility. As we all know, a wealth
of remarkable parallels is compatible with there being single
difference that makes a most significant difference. No decent person
thinks that animals should be treated cruelly. And apes are owed a
measure of moral consideration that goes well beyond not treating
them cruelly. Just so, there is fundamental difference between the
level of moral responsibility of which human beings are capable and
the level of moral responsibility of which apes are capable, where it is
to human beings that the substantially greater capacity for moral
responsibility is rightly attributed. So while there are undoubtedly
countless changes that human beings should make in the way that
they treat apes, it is a mistake to attribute to apes the same capacity
for moral responsibility that is properly attributed to human beings.
There is, then, a substantive moral threshold between apes and
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human beings rooted in the evolutionary development and biological
reality of the two species.
Richard Dawkins rightly notes, in his essay “Gaps in the
Mind” (p. 87) that this threshold is but the result of an evolutionary
accident; and he is equally right that we should be prepared to change
if the line moves. But even an accidental outcome in evolutionary
development—and in some sense all such outcomes are accidental—
can have indisputable moral significance if it stays in place for a
substantial period of time. The asymmetry between apes and human
beings with respect to moral responsibility, where the capacity of
human beings surpasses that of apes by far, has shown no signs at all
of shifting.
In this regard, let me note here that Spain’s own law according
apes the right to life and freedom nonetheless accords with there
being a significant difference in moral responsibility between apes
and human beings; for it is still permissible to keep apes in zoos
although a dramatic change in the quality of the zoo environment is
now required. Needless to say, keeping human beings in zoos is
simply not a moral option under any description. This is inextricably
tied to the reality that the capacity moral responsibility is attributed
nowadays to all human beings. Throughout history the primary basis
for one group of human beings depriving another group of human
beings of liberty, where no antecedent wrongdoing is first attributed
to the group being thus deprived, is that those being deprived have a
substantially diminished capacity for moral responsibility. Notice
that whereas Jews were thought to be irredeemably evil and so Jews
were murdered who had not committed a single wrongful act, blacks
were deemed to be mere moral simpletons who should be enslaved
(see Thomas 1993; Thomas 2005).
Significantly, the argument concerning responsibility is entirely
consistent with the view that chimpanzees have a right to life. For, as
the case of children and the elderly who are afflicted with significant
mental deterioration makes manifestly clear, having a right to life
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does not in the least entail that one is capable of any moral
responsibility, let alone full moral responsibility.
I begin with some basic reflections regarding human moral
responsibility.

I. Moral Responsibility
We have a morally significant difference between two creatures,
A and B, just in case the failure to perform a substantial moral act
leaves one creature open to serious moral criticism but not at all the
other. By this criterion, we have a morally significant difference
between 7-year old human beings and 30-year old human beings,
where both are completely healthy. No one expects a 7-year old to
make an effort to save the life of an adult who has a massive heart
attack in the presence of the child. No one thinks for a moment such
a child is open to moral criticism for not doing anything to obtain
assistance for the person. Obviously, just the opposite holds if
someone should have a massive heart attack in the presence of a 30
year old. At the very least, we think that the 30-year old should make
a most concerted effort to get some assistance for the heart attack
victim. If, instead, the 30-year old decided to take a walk in order to
enjoy the evening’s cool breeze, this would be deemed as none other
than unbridled moral callousness. By contrast, the 7-year old could
decide to go out and play without being so charged. If the heartattack victim should die while the 30-year old is taking a walk, then
we rightly say that the 30-year old bears some blame for the victim’s
death. But not in the case of the 7-year old who goes out to play.
More generally, one fundamental difference between the 7-year
old and the 30-year old can be put in terms of moral responsibility. A
entirely healthy 30-year old can be held morally responsible for (for
doing and refraining from doing) a myriad of things for which no
healthy 7-year old can be held morally responsible.
So imagine a genetic abnormality, call it the time-warped
development affliction, that allows for perfect development in human
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beings up until the age of 7 and then all psychological development
stops, though physical development continues. Thus, a person who
has the TWD affliction could live for 80 years and have the body of an
80-year old; yet, the person would still have the psychological
capacities of only a 7-year old and would behave accordingly. TWD
affliction is exceedingly rare. Only one out of every 500,000 infants
born are afflicted it.
Now, it would be manifestly wrong to hold that human beings
afflicted with TWD are just as capable of moral responsibility as any
perfectly healthy human being is. This brings out the quite important
truth that, strictly speaking, moral responsibility is not tied to being a
member of a certain species; rather, such responsibility is ineluctably
tied to having certain capacities.
What is true, of course, is that different capacities are
characteristic of each and every species. This is exactly what it means
to be a member of one species and not another. Thus, given normal
development any member of a given species will have or come to have
those capacities should that species-member continue living. This
holds no more or less for lions or apes or birds, and so on, than it
does for human beings. The simple truth of the matter is that, by far,
the overwhelming majority of human beings who reach the age of 30
have the capacities which enable moral responsibility to apply to
them. The human species would be a very different species, indeed,
were that not the case. In fact, criticizing human beings for not
taking apes more seriously morally would itself be rather ludicrous if
human psychological development completely stopped at the age of 7.
By contrast, it is clear that the normal course of the development
of animals does not carry in its wake moral responsibility on their
part. But what about the case of apes? To this I now turn.

II. The Ape
Without a doubt, the resemblance between apes and human
beings is absolutely striking. To the most casual observer, it is
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impossible to miss the fact that both apes and human beings are
quintessential social creatures, as the work of Jane Goodall (1971,
1996) makes abundantly clear. An ape left in complete isolation
would become psychologically deranged just as a human being
would. Apes form bonds of affection in ways that are analogous to
the formation of such bonds among human beings. Thus, just as a
human being can miss a loved-one, it is clear that apes can, too. And
just as many human skills, of which speaking is perhaps the most
obvious, are acquired through social interaction, the same holds for
ape. What is more, apes clearly take delight in engaging in
mimicking, mocking, and teasing behavior in just the way that
humans do. Apes engage in such behavior with one another; they
engage in such behavior with human beings. No doubt the piece de
resistance with regard to putting apes on the same moral plane as
human beings is that apes can be taught a language, it being
understood that being able to learn a language is on an entirely
different and vastly higher plane than being able to parrots various
words. No other non-human living creature comes even close to
having this capacity (see Roger S. Fouts and Deborah H., Fouts,
“Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language”). I shall return to this point in
Section §3 below.
The proponents of the Great Ape Project thus conclude that
when these considerations are given the weight that they should be
given, it would seem that there can be no justification for failing to
conclude that that apes should have the same moral standing that
human beings have (see Patterson and Gordon, “The Case for the
Personhood of Gorillas”).
Now, although I am not interested in quibbling, I do wonder
whether this move to assert parity between the psychological
development of apes and human beings is a bit too quick. For
instance, is it being claimed that apes at the very height of their
developmental powers exactly on a par with human beings at the
height of their developmental powers—such as a 30-year old? Or, do
we have something more akin to the following: apes at the height of
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their developmental powers are rather like human beings in fullbloom at the age of, say, 7-years old. 7-year old human beings can be
a lot of fun and they can do lots and lots of creative things. Healthy 7
year old children are full of surprises. But, as I have indicated in
Section §1, it is an incontrovertible fact that no one would ever
suppose that a 7-year old human being is equal in psychological
development to a 30-year old human being. So, it makes an
enormous difference whether the claim is that apes are more like a
completely healthy 7-year old or they are more like a completely
healthy 30-year old. There is simply no evidence whatsoever that the
latter is the case. To be equivocal here is disingenuous at best and
morally wrong at worse. One can easily raise the human age to 10 or
12. There is still an absolutely phenomenal difference in terms of
moral responsibility between a 30-year old and a 12-year old.
If there were no difference at all in the psychological
development of a fully developed ape and fully developed 30-year old
person, then moral responsibility would apply equally to both of
them.
Perhaps nothing brings out more the importance of clarity here
than the real-life instance in 2009 of the ape of Sandy Herald, named
Travis, who mauled the face of Charla Nash, who was visiting the
home of her friend Ms. Herald. If Travis is rather like a 30-year old
human being, then Travis is either deranged or evil. If, by contrast,
Travis is rather like a 7-year old, then we have a different assessment
entirely. In order to rescue Nash, the police eventually had to shoot
Travis. Suppose, though, that they had been able to save Nash
without killing Travis. What is unequivocally clear is that the very
idea of holding Travis morally blameworthy for his behavior would
have been simply out of the question. It is irrelevant that Travis may
have been given xanax, since surely that is not reason why he is not
held morally blameworthy for his behavior. And while the very idea
of having Travis as a pet is undoubtedly fulsome to those who
advocate for the equality of apes, it is worth noting that Ms. Herald

195

treated Travis more like a friend than a pet. Reportedly, they took
baths together, he regularly combed her hair, and they shared a bed.
In any event, the point remains that the idea of morally blaming
Travis, and so holding him morally responsible, for his behavior
simply does not get off the ground. And the reason for this stems not
so much from the thought that he should never have been living
among human beings in the first place as it does from the reality that
holding a ape blameworthy is essentially incoherent. Notice that we
would make the exact same assessment had Travis traversed a forest
and seized upon and killed a human being walking along the edge of a
creek because Travis deemed that his terrain was being violated.
The concluding example of the preceding paragraph brings us to
another matter that needs to be noted regarding the ability of apes to
exhibit behavior that mirrors human behavior.
Understandably, much is made of the idea that apes can learn a
language. What no one draws attention to, however, is just how
limited this is. In this regard, the difference between the speaking
capacity of a 7-year old human being and a 30 old human being is
most illuminating. If a 7-year old had the command of a language
equivalent to that of a 30-year old that would be impressive beyond
measure. The child would clearly be gifted. There is absolutely no
evidence whatsoever that an ape’s command of a language could ever
be equal to the command that a 30-year old has of that language.
This proves to be significant because, with human beings, there is a
positive correlation between language development and the
development of moral capacities. No one, for instance, expects a 7
year old to grasp the significance of trust anywhere near the extent to
which a 30-year old does. Indeed, in terms of tonality, bodily
language, and word-choice, the way in which we would speak to a 7
year old who violated our trust should be fundamentally different
than the way in which we would speak to a 30-year old who has done
so. To state the obvious, the very idea that one should trust a 7-year
old in precisely the same manner and to the same extent that one
would trust a 30-year old is an entirely indefensible stance.
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At the age of 30, words can (and so often do) have a moral
gravitas that has no equal whatsoever in the life of a child at the age
of 7 or even 12. So it is whether we are talking about moral or
immoral behavior. Thus, to take the case of immoral behavior, the
utterance of a sexist or racial slur by a 7-year old is one thing;
whereas it is quite another when uttered by a 30-year old. Is it being
claimed that words can attain this level of moral weightiness in the
lives apes?
A related point has to do with self-concept. Suffice it to say that
there is also a direct correction between language development and
the development of a self-concept. Every 30-year old can think of a
multitude of ways in which the self-concept of a 7-year does not
approximate the self-concept of a 30-year old. This point most
certainly holds between apes and 30-year olds. Sexuality and talent
are quite salient examples in this regard. As I noted above, it was
reported that Ms. Herald would often take baths with Travis. What
one simply does not imagine is that the ape Travis ever had the
following thought whilst they were in the bathtub together: “Nice,
this might lead to something more interesting. What has taken her so
long? I have much more going for me in terms of personality than
her deceased husband. I deserve it”.
The preceding observations are quite searching because they
forcefully raise the question of what exactly the proponents of the
Human Ape Project mean when they insist that apes and human
beings should be deemed equal in their moral status. For surely the
argument cannot be that apes see themselves as deserving of the
same moral status that human beings have. This, to be sure, does not
entail that apes should not have that status. If, however, the very
nature of apes is such that they lack the psychological wherewithal to
see themselves as deserving of the same moral status as human
beings (a point to which I return in the section below), then it looks
for all the world as if we have a quite significant moral difference
between the two species. This, in turn, would suggest that if apes
should have the same moral status as human beings, it cannot be for
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exactly the same reasons that human beings have moral status they
have that apes should also have that moral status.

III. Reflections from Darwin
In the Descent of Man, Charles Darwin makes the following
observation: “. . . the difference in mind between man and the higher
animals [for example, apes], great as it is, certainly is one of degree
and not of kind” (Darwin 1874, Chpt. IV under “Summary of the last
two chapters”). The observation is clearly a double-edge sword. On
the one hand, the point is that human reasoning is not so different
from the reasoning of the higher animals that human beings should
conclude there are no similarities in the reasoning that takes place
between the two groups. On the other, he concedes that the
difference in terms of powers of reasoning is considerable. Darwin’s
remark is compatible with the view that it is mistake for human
beings to think that reasoning on the part of human beings is so
different from reasoning on the part of higher animals that the
former cannot learn anything from observing the latter. Yet, this
observation stops considerably short of entailing that human beings
and the higher animals should be accorded the same moral status.
Indeed, Darwin is clear that there are substantial differences between
human beings and the higher animals in terms of the concepts that
the former (but not the latter) grasp; and he held that in many
instances the development of these concepts is tied to the use of
language. He observed that as of the writing of his essay, The
Descent of Man, the precept known as the Golden Rule is held only
among human beings. What Darwin denied is that these differences
are fixed in perpetuity—a quite modest claim for an evolutionary
theorist. As the arguments of Patrick Blandin (2007) remind us, the
malleability of living things would seem to have a plausibility that not
even Darwin himself imagined.
What makes language so important? The answer, I believe,
following Thomas Nagel’s idea in The Possibility of Altruism, is that
language makes it possible for creatures to indicate publicly and
explicitly that they simultaneously take both their future selves
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seriously and the selves of others equally seriously. This verbal
affirmation that human beings can give to one another, which often
takes the form of promise-making, is of extraordinary significance
(see Grice 1989). Marriage vows, which are a form promise-making,
are surely the quintessential example of this simultaneity. This is
perhaps part of the reason why witnessing these vows is so very
moving although we already know the words and, in some instances,
have heard them on many occasions. For there is no equal to
witnessing that moment of the public simultaneous affirmation of the
“self” and the “other” unfold. Language, of course, is not the only way
in which human beings can affirm themselves and one another. Just
so, nothing whatsoever replaces the public affirmation of both that
comes with language. What we all know is that no matter how
intently and movingly two human beings look at one another face-to
face, the utterance of the words “I love you” makes an utterly non
trivial difference.
For these and countless other reasons, I locate the difference
between apes and human beings at the level of responsibility. The
level of responsibility that we accord to fully-developed adult human
beings far exceeds the level of responsibility that we accord to fullydeveloped adult apes. This difference in responsibility is supported
by Darwin’s observation that human beings constitute the only
species where the observance of the Golden Rule takes place among
its members among its members.
Arguably, there is a conceptual overlap between the members of
a species being such that they come to speak a natural language in the
course of their normal biological development and the members of
that species having a quite substantial capacity for moral
responsibility. Indeed, one reason why we know that the slaveowners
of American Slavery were more than a little disingenuous in their
assessment of black slaves is that the slaveowners routinely had their
children cared for and succored by black slaves, with all that this
entailed in terms of verbal communication and affirmation. It would
never have occurred to the slave owners to have their children cared
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for by dogs or deer or even apes. And for all the talk by the authors in
the anthology The Great Ape Project about the moral personhood of
apes, surely no one would dare suggest that it makes no morally
relevant difference whether we have a human being or an ape be the
primary care taker of a human infant. The problem is not so much
that the apes would intentionally harm the infant human being, but
that in terms of moral development what we would have is a human
being who is rather like someone who is afflicted with the fanciful
case of Time Warped Development affliction described in Section §1
above (see Baertschi 1995).
I have drawn attention to American Slavery precisely because it
is not uncommon for those to argue for the rights of apes to draw a
comparison to the mistreatment of apes and the wrong of human
slavery generally, as Cavalieri and Singer vividly do in their epilogue
“The Great Ape Project – And Beyond”. For the reason just
mentioned, slaveowners were clearly in denial regarding the equal
humanity of black slaves. I agree without hesitation that human
beings have been in denial regarding the remarkable moral capacities
that apes possess. My only point is that the moral capacities
possessed by apes surely do not give us moral parity between apes
and human beings. For then there would be no difference between
the responsibilities of apes to human beings and the moral
responsibilities of human beings to apes. Notice, too, that the very
idea of applying legal responsibility to apes is all the more
indefensible. Yet, the end of slavery for human beings has properly
meant according human beings full legal standing and so the
responsibility thereunto appertaining, it being understood that legal
responsibility presupposes the capacity for moral responsibility.
It is arguable that some human beings have failed to see
themselves as morally equal to other human beings. Presumably, the
oppression of slavery can have that effect upon many of its victims.
So there is a very real sense in which these oppressed individuals
needed someone to speak on their behalf. For when these slaves and,
in particular, the children of these slaves were treated as moral
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equals, they fully grasped this moral reality and it properly resonated
with their humanity. That is what we would expect. This stands as a
sort of resounding proof that the charge of inherent inferiority with
respect to this or that group was ever so mistaken.
It would be a mistake, however, to think that the case of apes is
exactly analogous to slaves thus oppressed. No defender of the moral
equality of apes has even come close to suggesting that a like moral
awakening would happen to apes if only human beings were to treat
apes as moral equals. And this suggests the mistreatment of apes and
the enslavement of human beings, though both clearly and
unequivocally wrong, are not the moral parallel that so many
defenders of the Great Apes Project claim it to be.

IV. Animals and Human Beings: Some Concluding
Remarks
The slogan of the Great Apes Project is “Morality Beyond
Humanity”. The meaning is clear, namely that morality applies
equally and fully to creatures other than human beings. Ironically,
the moral reality of things undermines the very symmetry that is
being put forward as a moral ideal. For no one argues that non
human animals have a moral responsibility to one another. Nor, a
fortiori, does anyone argue that non-human animals have a moral
responsibility to human beings. It is no accident that the moral
responsibility for moral equality tout court is entirely one directional,
namely from human beings to animals. After all, if moral equality so
applies, the ineluctable fact of the matter is that it is only human
beings who have the capacity to take on the moral responsibility of so
upholding such a conception of morality. Indeed, it is only human
beings who can give articulation to that very ideal, and so who can
thus publicly affirm the equal moral standing of all. It would be an
entirely different world if apes could look human beings in the eyes
and exclaim “We apes should take you human beings as morally
seriously as we apes take one another”. That, alas, is simply not a
possibility—at least not at this point in the evolutionary development
of living things.
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Presently, it is woefully implausible to hold that apes can take
one another as seriously as moral creatures as human beings can take
one another. This is what makes the marriage example given above
so significant. A fortiori, then, it is implausible to suppose that apes
can take human beings seriously enough as moral creatures to come
close to being owed the moral considerateness that human beings
rightly owe one another.
Needless to say, the view that human beings owe animals,
especially apes, a level of moral considerateness that heretofore they
have not accorded animals is most defensible. In fact there may be
some truth to Schopenhauer’s suggestion, in his essay On the Basis of
Morality, that being morally considerate to animals makes human
beings morally better creatures. But that truth does not require
putting animals, especially apes, and human beings on the same
moral plane. This is demonstrated by the argument of Section §1.
If there were such an abnormality as time-warped development
affliction, it is manifestly clear that any 30-year old human being with
the TWD affliction should be treated with considerable compassion
and decency. Indeed, Schopenhauer’s observation would seem ever
so applicable here. However, the asymmetry is also manifestly clear:
Precisely because of the significant different in capacities between
healthy human beings and TWD afflicted human beings, the
considerateness would be an asymmetrical one of moral
responsibility on the part of healthy human beings towards TWD
afflicted human beings. By hypothesis, TWD afflicted human beings
are human beings who suffer from an abnormality. What is true,
alas, is that not owing to any abnormality at all apes do not equal the
moral and intellectual capacities of healthy human beings. Hence,
while it is certainly plausible to hold that apes are owed a level of
moral considerateness heretofore denied to them, it is not at all
plausible to argue that this so is because apes and human beings are
on the same moral plane.
If the idea of morality beyond humanity that has been put
forward by the Great Ape Project means that apes are owed a level of
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moral considerateness heretofore denied to them, then we a claim
that is quite tenable. If, however, the claim is that apes are owed
precisely the same level of moral considerateness that human beings
are owed because there is no morally relevant difference between
apes and human beings, then what we have is an untenable claim.
For if we have a morally relevant difference between human beings
afflicted with TWD and those who are not, then surely we have a
morally relevant difference between apes and human beings. It is
simply not possible that we could have a morally relevant difference
in the first instance but not the second one.
Speciesism is the wrong of not acknowledging the moral qualities
that non-human animals possess that are similar or equivalent or
even superior to the moral qualities that human beings possess.
However, since it is manifestly clear that no one thinks that apes are
in any way obligated to human beings, it clearly cannot be a form of
speciesism to be mindful of the differences on the basis of which that
is so. In this essay, I have aimed for no more but then also no less
than precisely that2.

Notes
1. (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin 1993). Unless a year is given after a
name, references are essays contained in the collection of essays by
Cavelieri and Singer.
2. A profound note of thanks goes to the students of Philosophy 191,
with whom over the past three semesters I have discussed the idea of
equality between apes and human beings as we read various essays in
Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (eds.). The penultimate version of
this essay was commented upon by Adam Schechter and Joseph
Lynch, I am so very grateful to them both for their searching
comments that have given rise to significant improvements in this
essay.
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